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Judicial Immunity from Charter Review : 
Myth or Reality ? 
Ghislain OTIS * 
L'auteur s'attache à démontrer, dans la première partie de cette étude, 
que les tribunaux et les juges peuvent être tenus de se conformer aux 
dispositions de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés bien que la Cour 
suprême ait statué que le pouvoir judiciaire n 'est pas visé par l'article 32(1). Il 
propose deux types de situations où les actions du judiciaire peuvent faire 
l'objet de contestations fondées sur la Charte. Cette dernière pourra dans ces 
cas être invoquée parce que son application se justifie indépendamment de 
l'article 32(1) et du fait que la portée des garanties constitutionnelles ne se 
trouve pas étendue au secteur privé. La deuxième partie de l'étude traite du 
problème particulier de déterminer la réparation devant être octroyée à la 
victime d'une violation de la Charte imputable au pouvoirjudiciaire. Même si 
les limites à la responsabilité des juges découlant de la loi et de la common law 
ne trouvent pas directement application dans le cadre d'un recours fondé sur 
l'article 24(1) de la Charte, l'immunité personnelle des juges apparaît comme 
une modalité importante du principe constitutionnel de l'indépendance 
judiciaire. 
In the first part of this article, the author argues that the Supreme Court's 
exclusion of the judiciary from the ambit of section 32(1) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not create an immunity from Charter 
review in favour of courts and judges. He identifies two broad categories of 
cases where judicial action is indeed subject to Charter scrutiny. In these cases 
the Charter applies because a basis for review can be found independently of 
section 32(1) and because there is no risk of a direct intrusion of Charter 
dictates into the private sphere. In the second part of the paper, the appropriate 
remedial response to judicial breaches of Charter guarantees is investigated. 
It is shown that the statutory and common law rules restricting judicial 
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liability cannot dictate when a monetary award is "appropriate and just" 
within the terms of section 24(1) of the Charter. Personal immunity from 
constitutional suits, however, appears to be required as an aspect of the 
constitutional principle of judicial independence. 
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There has been some discussion recently injudicial and academic circles 
as to whether the actions of the judiciary may in certain cases be immune from 
direct scrutiny pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms '. 
The issue has arisen in the wake of the ruling of the Supreme Court of 
Canada2 in R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.11. In that controversial 
decision4, Canada's highest jurisdiction held that the constitutional guarantees 
1. Part I Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 U.K. hereinafter 
cited as "the Charter". 
2. Hereinafter referred to as "the Supreme Court". 
3. [1986]2S.C.R. 573. 
4. For a sample of the often harshly critical academic response to Dolphin Delivery see : 
D. BEATTY, "Constitutional Conceits : The Coercive Authority of Courts", (1987) 37 Univ. 
of Tor. L.J. 183; J. A. M AN WARING, "Bringing the Common Law to the Bar of Justice: A 
Comment on the Decision in the Case of Dolphin Delivery Ltd.", (1987) 19 Ottawa L.R. 
413; J.D. GAONON, "L'arrêt Dolphin Delivery: La porte est-elle ouverte ou fermée?", 
(1987) 32 McGill L.J. 925 ; B. SLATTERY, "The Charter's Relevance to Private Litigation : 
Does Dolphin Deliver?", (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 905; B. ETHERINGTON, "Constitutional 
Law — Charier of Rights and Freedoms, Sections 2(b) and 1 — Application of the Charter 
to the Common Law in Private Litigation — Freedom of Expression — Picketing in 
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enshrined in the Canadian Charter do not constrain private conduct5. The 
court also determined that the only actors enumerated in section 32(1) are the 
legislative, executive and administrative branches of the state6. The courts, 
according to their Lordships, do not fall within the ambit of section 32(1) 
because they cannot be regarded as a branch of government for the purpose of 
Charter application7. While conceding that the courts are certainly bound by 
the Charter "as they are bound by all laws"8, Mr. Justice Mclntyre indicated 
that in this situation the Charter extends to them "as neutral arbiters" rather 
than as party to a dispute9. It is, in other words, incumbent upon the courts to 
uphold the Charter when it binds the parties to proceedings instituted before 
them. They are then constrained as detached constitutional adjudicators but 
not necessarily as primary actors whose conduct is subject to direct Charter 
regulation, and thus exposed to remedial measures pursuant to section 24(1). 
Such an interpretation of section 32(1) is highly questionable and should 
not have been adopted considering the clear possibility of conferring a 
broader connotation upon the word "government"10. But the purpose of this 
article is not to reiterate the criticism levelled elsewhere by this writer against 
this aspect of Dolphin Delivery ' '. It is proposed instead to show that Dolphin 
Labour Disputes — Retail Wholesale and Dep. Store Union Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery 
Ltd.", (1987) 66 Can. Bar. Rev. 818; P. HOGG, "The Dolphin Delivery Case: The 
Application of the Charter to Private Action", (1987) 51 Saks. L. Rev. 273; A.C. 
HUTCHINSON and A. PETTER, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the 
Charter", (1988) 38 Univ. of Tor. L.J. 278 ; E.P. BELOBABA, "The Charter of Rights and 
Private Litigation : The Dilemna of Dolphin Delivery", in N.R. FINKELSTEIN and B. MACLEOD 
ROGERS (eds.), Charter Issues in Civil Cases, Carswell, 1988, p. 29 ; P.W. HOGG, "Who is 
Bound by the Charter?", in G.A. BEAUDOUIN (ed.), Your Clients and the Charter / Liberty 
and Equality, Montréal, Les Éditions Yvon Biais, 1988, p. 15; J.L. BAUDOIN, "Qu'en est-il 
du droit civil?" id., p. 27 ; R. TASSÉ, "À qui incombe l'obligation de respecter les droits et 
libertés garantis par la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés?", id., p. 35; D. GIBSON, 
"What did Dolphin Deliver? Comments", id., p. 75; R. DUSSEAULT, "Qu'est-ce que le 
gouvernement et quelle est l'étendue de sa sphère? — Commentaires", id., p. 91 ; Y.M. 
MORISSETTE, "Certains problèmes d'applicabilité des Chartes des droits et libertés en droit 
québécois", in Application des chartes des droits et libertés en matière civile, Formation 
permanente du Barreau du Québec, Montréal, Les Éditions Yvon Biais, 1988, p. 1 ; Y. DE 
MONTIGNY, "Le domaine des relations privées : un 'no man's land' constitutionnel", (1988) 
22 R.J. T. 243 ; A.J. PETTER and P.J. MONAHAN, "Developments in Constitutional Law : 
The 1986-87 Term", (1988), 10 Supreme Court L.R. 61. 
5. Supra, note 3, p. 597. 
6. Id., p. 598-599. 
7. Id., p. 598-600. 
8. Id., p. 600. 
9. Id. 
10. See G. OTIS, "The Charter, Private Action and the Supreme Court", (1987) 19 Ottawa L. 
Rev. 71, p. 87-88. 
11. Id. 
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Delivery, as it was decided and later interpreted by the Supreme Court12, 
Joes not support a theory of judicial immunity from primary review. It is 
argued in the first part of this article that, even after Dolphin Delivery, a 
considerable sphere of judicial activity remains directly subject to the pres-
criptions of the Charter. Within that sphere, judges are reached as primary 
actors and not simply as lofty constitutional adjudicators. 
The second part of this article deals with the delicate problem of devising 
the appropriate method for redressing judicial constitutional violations. The 
discussion will centre on the need to harmonize the efficacious vindication of 
Charter rights and the necessity of fostering judicial independence 
1. The Application of the Charter to the Judiciary 
1.1. Dolphin Delivery and the Notion of Judicial Immunity 
Dolphin Delivery has been understood by some judges and writers as 
precluding the imputation of an infringement of Charter guarantees to the 
courts and judges. Thus, in Royer et al. v. Migneault13 a monetary suit was 
brought against a Quebec Superior Court judge in relation to remarks he 
made in banco questioning in unequivocal terms the competence of lawyers 
acting for the defence in a criminal trial. The plaintiffs, two members of the 
Bar of Quebec, based their case against the judge partly on the submission 
that his attack on their professional abilities amounted to a breach of their 
rights under section 7 of the Charter. Dolphin Delivery had been decided 
when the case reached the Quebec Court of Appeal. Addressing the issue 
whether the provisions of the Charter could buttress the claim against the 
judge, Mr. Justice Rothman, speaking on behalf of the court on this point, 
relied on the construction of section 32(1) proposed by Mr. Justice Mclntyre 
to conclude that : 
... s. 32(1) of the Charter, which defines the actors to whom the Charier is 
applicable, cannot be interpreted to include the judiciary as a branch of 
"government" or to include courts or judges as agents of "governmental 
action".,4 
The cause of action could not be sustained since in uttering the allegedly 
injurious words, the defendant could not violate a constitutional right or 
freedom. This was a clear finding of the court even though Mr. Justice 
Rothman would still have rejected the claim had the judge's conduct been 
12. See the cases cited infra. 
13. (1988), 32C.R.R. 1. 
14. Id., p. 15. 
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covered by section 32(1)15. A similar solution was arrived at in at least one 
other case where a judge was sued for breach of Charter rights 16. It is obvious 
that by virtue of this understanding of Dolphin Delivery, courts and judges 
might never be characterized as constitutional wrongdoers under the Charter. 
Such an approach seems to be part of a strategy aimed at safeguarding the 
traditional personal immunity from suit enjoyed by judges in the name of 
judicial independence. But a restriction of liability can probably be achieved 
through the fashioning of appropriate remedial techniques rather than by 
means of a complete bar on direct Charter review of judicial action. The 
question of what constitutes an "appropriate and just" remedy for judicial 
constitutional wrongdoing should be kept distinct from the issue of review. 
A number of commentators have also ascribed to Dolphin Delivery the 
effect of exempting the courts from the application of the Charter. While 
being sometimes harshly critical of Mr. Justice Mclntyre's analysis of sec-
tion 32(1), they apparently view judicial immunity as an inevitable corollary 
of the Supreme Court's refusal to regard the judicial branch as part of 
government. The reaction of these academic writers is fairly summed up in the 
assertion that "[o]n this interpretation section 32(1) and in turn the whole 
Charter are interpreted so as to exclude their application to the third — the 
judicial — branch of our government"17. It is apparent that this view is 
founded on the assumption that the Supreme Court's exclusion of the 
judiciary from section 32(1) is conclusive as regards the subjection of courts 
and judges to the dictates of the Charter. It is submitted that this assumption 
is incorrect. 
1.2. Charter Review of Judicial Action with Regard to Public Law 
Arguments to the effect that the approach taken to section 32(1) in 
Dolphin Delivery amounts to "... excusing the judiciary from constitutional 
review..."18 cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's willingness to 
expose at least a portion of the common law to possible invalidation for 
offending the Charter. Mr. Justice Mclntyre acknowledged that the common 
law is reviewable but not when it regulates private conduct or is invoked in a 
15. Id, p. 15-17. 
16. See Charters v. Harper (mi), 79 N.B.R. (2d) 28, p. 39^4 (N.B.Q.B.). 
17. See BEATTY, supra, note 4, p. 188. See also HOGG, supra, note 4, (1987) 51 Sask. L.R. 273, 
p. 274 ; PETTER and MONAHAN, supra, note 4, p. 123 ; MANWARING, supra, note 4, p. 438 ; 
H.P. GLENN, "L'article 24(1) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés : la réparation 
juste et convenable" in Application des chartes des droits et libertés en matière civile, supra, 
note 4, 75, p. 89. 
18. See BEATTY, id., p. 190. 
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purely private dispute ". His Lordship affirmed that the Charter could reach 
the common law whenever it was relied upon by a governmental actor to 
justify conduct encroaching on constitutional guarantees20. The door was 
therefore not closed completely to Charter control of at least some legal rules 
and orders of judicial origin, despite the refusal to classify the judiciary 
among the actors referred to in section 32(1). Even when judge-made law is 
attacked primarily as the basis of governmental action, it is ultimately the 
constitutionality of a rule which is the product of judicial action that is at 
issue21. 
In construing section 32(1) the way he did, Mr. Justice Mclntyre was not 
concerned with providing a complete and definite answer to the question 
whether judicial action can ever be vulnerable to a Charter claim. Instead, he 
was intent on consolidating his finding that the private sector was not directly 
affected. He noted that if the judicial branch were to be fitted within the term 
"government", any court order would be susceptible to review22. This, in his 
opinion, would render futile the restriction of Charter duties to the public 
sector since virtually all private dealings could be brought within the purview 
of the Charter through review of judicial enforcement of private 
arrangements23. 
Scrutiny of judge-made rules of a public law nature, that is, not 
regulating purely private relationships, does not frustrate the insulation of 
private action from constitutional attack. Nor does scrutiny of judicial 
enforcement of the public law in general. In fact, review of the public law 
process only conforms with the Supreme Court's own characterization of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 as a "... yardstick of reconciliation between the 
individual and the community and their respective rights..."24. Justice Mclntyre's 
19. Supra, note 3, p. 599 and 602-604. It is interesting to note that the Quebec Court of Appeal 
recently decided that the Charter does not apply when a private party alleges defamation by 
another private party in breach of section 1053 of the Civil Code. See Larose v. Malenfant, 
[1988] R.J.Q. 2643. 
20. Id., p. 599. 
21. It is therefore not possible to subscribe to Professor Hogg's suggestion that the common 
law may not really be said to be subject to the Charter when it is the basis of governmental 
action. The learned author thinks that : "It is questionable whether one ought to describe 
the Charter as applicable to the common law in even these situations, where it is the 
presence of the governmental actor, not the source of the actor's power, that makes the 
Charter applicable", see supra, note 4, (1987) 51 Sask. L. Rev. 274, p. 278. See also DE 
MONTIONY, supra, note 4, p. 247. 
22. Supra, note 3, p. 600. 
23. Id., p. 600-601. This understanding of the effect of subjecting court orders to the Charter, 
however, is questionable, see OTIS, supra, note 10, p. 87-89 and BELOBABA, supra, note 4, 
p. 42-45. 
24. Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, p. 366. 
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interpretation of section 32(1) was intended to confirm rather than to weaken 
the role of the Charter as a public law instrument. The fact that he did nor rule 
out the reviewability of the common law in the public sphere may be 
construed as an indication that the question whether courts are governmental 
actors is not conclusive in ascertaining the effect of Charter obligations on the 
judiciary. A justification for review may be inherent in the Charter's public 
law character even if the judiciary does not rank among governmental actors 
as such for the purpose of section 32(1). This crucial aspect of Dolphin 
Delivery has generally been neglected in the chorus of criticism it has sparked 
off. 
Another judgment has been handed down by the Supreme Court which 
confirms that Dolphin Delivery has not decreed the impossibility of judicial 
constitutional infringements. The Supreme Court found in B.C.G.E.V. v. 
British Columbia25 that a court order designed to enforce a judicially 
developed prohibition of criminal contempt of court must comply with the 
Charter. In that case, the appellant union was contesting an injunction 
restraining its members from picketing British Columbia law courts in the 
course of a legal strike. The impugned order had been issued by the Chief 
Justice of British Columbia, on his own motion and exporte, on the grounds 
that the picketing interfered with the administration of justice and thus 
constituted the offence of contempt in the face of the court. The union 
questioned the constitutionality of the order arguing inter alia that it offended 
rights and freedoms set out in sections 2, 7 and 11 of the Charter. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the courts below that the union's 
actions amounted to criminal contempt as defined by established principles 
of common law, and that the judge's handling of the picketing was therefore 
fully justified in view of the superordinate importance of ensuring the 
unimpeded functioning of the law courts26. Before examining the specific 
Charter claims put forward by the appellant, the Supreme Court had to 
determine whether the document could be invoked at all against the injunction. 
Chief Justice Dickson, speaking for the court on this point, decided on the 
basis of Dolphin Delivery that the Charter was indeed applicable : 
R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, holds that the 
Charter does apply to the common law, although not where the common law is 
invoked with reference to a purely private dispute. At issue here is the validity of 
a common law breach of the criminal law and ultimately the authority of the 
court to punish for breaches ofthat law. The court is acting on its own motion 
25. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214. 
26. See also, Newfoundland (Attorney General) v. N.A.P.E., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 204. 
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and not at the instance of a private party. The motivation of the court's actions 
is entirely "public" in nature, rather than "private". The criminal law is being 
applied to vindicate the rule of law and the fundamental freedoms protected by 
the Charter. At the same time, however, this branch of the criminal law, like any 
other, must comply with the fundamental standards established by the 
Charter.27 
In Dolphin Delivery a court order enjoining picketing was deemed 
unaffected by the Charter's provisions because the common law rule it served 
to effectuate related to private dealings and was applied in private litigation. 
In B. C. G. E. U., on the other hand, a judicially imposed restraint on picketing 
was reviewed since it gave rise to a "public" dispute. A remarkable feature of 
the passage just quoted is that it contains no mention of section 32(1), and no 
query as to whether judicial conduct constitutes governmental action. In fact, 
it is not suggested once in the judgment that an element of governmental 
action is present so as to activate the Charter. At the same time, their 
Lordships clearly focused the Charter debate on a judge-made rule of 
criminal law and the manner in which a judge took the initiative of issuing an 
order under the authority of such rule. 
Thus, the discussion of the Charter issues was dominated by considerations 
bearing upon the conduct of the judge in issuing the impugned order. Chief 
Justice Dickson stated that, assuming there had been a deprivation of liberty 
under section 7, an ex parte injunction was in the circumstances consistent 
with fundamental justice28. The appellant's contention based on section 11 
also failed because no one was charged with an offence29. But the Chief 
Justice considered that a prima facie breach of the picketers' freedom of 
expression under section 2(b) did result from the injunction30. The ensuing 
section 1 enquiry centred on the reasonableness of the judge's handling of the 
picketing given the pressing public interest in unhampered access to justice. It 
was ruled that his decision to take immediate and unilateral action to secure 
public access to the courts served an objective "of sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom"31. The 
order was also deemed proportionate within the meaning of the tripartite 
Oakes formula32. 
In view of such a sustained and close Charter scrutiny of judicial action, 
it may be tempting to suggest that B. C. G.E. U. signals the implicit abandonment 
27. Supra, note 25, p. 243-244. 
28. Id., p. 245-246. 
29. Id., p. 246-247. 
30. Id., p. 244-245. 
31. Id., p. 248 quoting R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, p. 352. 
32. Id., p. 248-249. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, p. 135-140. 
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by the Supreme Court of its much-maligned refusal to treat the judiciary as 
part of government. But it must be pointed out that the court reaffirmed the 
non-application of the Charter to private disputes and to judge-made rules of 
law governing private relationships. This indicates that Chief Justice Dickson 
did not want to equate any judicial action and order to governmental 
conduct. It is submitted that the better view is that by not even averting to 
section 32(1) in resolving an important problem of Charter application, the 
Supreme Court has merely made it clear once again that this provision is not 
invariably conclusive with respect to constitutional review of judicial action 
pursuant to the Charter. 
The B. C. G.E. U. case concerned the alleged infringement of constitutional 
rights flowing from the judicial development and enforcement of rules that 
brought to bear against individuals the full power of constraint of the 
criminal law in order to foster collective interests. The court apparently felt 
that the tension between individual liberty and collective interests that was 
inherent in the impugned rule of criminal law and its judicial implementation 
rendered the dispute "public", and thus triggered the application of the 
Charter. Such an attitude is consonant with the Supreme Court's understanding 
of the Charter as an instrument of protection of individual and minority 
interests from the excesses of majoritarian rule33. Independently of the 
meaning of "government" in section 32(1), scrutiny of the court order was 
founded upon the grand design of the Charter to balance collective and 
individual or minority rights. 
Another judge-made rule of criminal law was attacked on the basis of the 
Charter in a case decided recently by the Supreme Court. In R. v. Bernard34, 
the accused raised a defence of drunkenness against a charge of sexual assault 
causing bodily harm contrary to section 246.2(c) of the Criminal Code. He 
invoked sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter to question the constitutionality 
of the judge-made rule whereby self-induced intoxication cannot prevent 
criminal liability in a general intent offence35. A majority of the court 
33. In R. v. Holmes, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914, Chief Justice Dickson noted p. 931: "[t]he 
overarching principle of judicial review under the Charter is that the judiciary is entrusted 
with the duty of ensuring that legislatures do not infringe unjustifiably upon certain 
fundamental individual and collective interests in the name of the broader common good". 
This aspect of the Supreme Court's Charter jurisprudence has been particularly apparent 
with respect to the application and interpretation of the limitation clause. For a recent 
review of the Supreme Court's approach in this area, see R.M. ELLIOT, "The Supreme 
Court of Canada and Section 1 —The Erosion of the Common Front", (1988), 12 Queens 
L.J. 277. 
34. [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833. 
35. See Leary v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29. 
682 Les Cahiers de Droit (1989) 30 C. de D. 673 
apparently took for granted the direct application of the Charter to the 
contested common law rule and dealt with the constitutional aspect of the 
case accordingly. 
Mr. Justice La Forest, however, canvassed whether the criminal law of 
judicial origin could be invalidated for offending Charter rights. He stated 
that it would be "... anomalous if the courts could infringe such a fundamental 
right [...] while any attempt by Parliament to do so would be subjected to 
searching scrutiny under s. 1 as established by this court"36. He consequently 
found that "... when a common law rule is found to infringe upon a right or 
freedom guaranted by the Charter, it must be justified in the same way as 
legislative rules"37. In his separate reasons, the Chief Justice approached the 
problem of Charter application somewhat differently. He thought the impugned 
rule had to be "overruled" on the basis of the passage in Dolphin Delivery 
where Mr. Justice Mclntyre points out that the judiciary "ought" to develop 
the common law so as to uphold Charter values38. Mr. Justice Mclntyre was 
referring to the desirability in the private law sphere of taking into account the 
policies embodied in the constitutional document39. 
It is difficult to understand why the Chief Justice felt obliged to resort to 
this rather indirect basis for a Charter assessment of a rule very similar in 
nature to that which was under attack in B. C. G. E. U., namely, a judge-made 
rule of criminal law which did not impact on purely private dealings. Why did 
his Lordship not find, as he did in B.C.G.E.U., that the case was one of 
"public" litigation? The approach of the court in B.C.G.E.U. is certainly 
preferable because it dispels all doubts as to whether the judiciary simply 
"ought", as a matter of public policy to take Charter values into account or 
has a constitutional duty to obey the Charter in criminal law matters. It also 
ensures the availability of a remedy under section 24( 1 ) of the Charter in case 
of judicial breach. Mr. Justice Dickson was the only one in Bernard to have 
departed clearly from the B.C.G.E.U. analysis. Such a departure was not 
warranted and it is hoped that it will not become a feature of Charter 
jurisprudence. 
The foregoing analysis of Dolphin Delivery and B.C.G.E.U. indicates 
that, despite the views expressed to the contrary, constitutional violations of 
judicial origin are possible. The Charter applies for two reasons ; first, there is 
no direct control of purely private action and litigation ; secondly, scrutiny of 
36. Supra, note 34, p. 891. 
37. Id., p. 891-892. 
38. Supra, note 34, p. 851. 
39. See supra, note 3, p. 603. 
G. OTIS Judicial Immunity... 683 
the courts can be justified under the Charter itself irrespective of the meaning 
attached to "government" in section 32(1). It is argued in the next section that 
a similar rationale can be articulated to explain review in another important 
category of cases. 
1.3. Review of Judicial Action under Specific Provisions 
of the Charter 
In a number of decisions rendered before and after Dolphin Delivery, the 
courts have acknowledged that members of the judiciary can be obligated by 
the Charter as primary actors. They have also, in some instances, awarded 
remedies under section 24(1) of the Charter to redress serious judicial violations 
of constitutional guarantees. A brief overview of some of these decisions will 
reveal that they are reconciliable with Dolphin Delivery and B.C.G.E.V. 
because they did not involve scrutiny of purely private action, and the 
application of the Charter to judicial conduct could be justified independently 
of the governmental action test of section 32(1). 
Some Charter provisions directly reach into the judicial sphere of 
activity in that they textually, or by necessary implication, treat a defective 
judicial process as an integral part of the mischief to be checked by a 
constitutional guarantee. An example of such a provision is section 11(b) 
which gives everyone charged with an offence the right to be tried within a 
reasonable time. It is apparent that the constitutional duty to avoid undue 
delay encompasses various stages in the administration of justice, including 
the conduct of the trial by the court itself. In Mills v. R.40, a majority of the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the special responsibility of the judiciary in 
avoiding unconstitutional delays41. The subsequent case of R. v Rahey42 
presented their Lordships with a concrete case of infringement by a judge of 
section 11(b). All the justices agreed that a trial judge had caused an unreason-
able delay by initiating 19 adjournments over a period of 11 months before 
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. Rahey is not the only case where 
responsibility for a violation of section 11(b) has been clearly laid at the door 
of a judge43. 
In Rahey, the Supreme Court did not touch on the issue whether the 
courts were bound by the Charter under section 32(1). The application of 
40. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863. 
41. Id., p. 940-941 (per Lamer J.). 
42. [1987] I S.C.R. 588. 
43. See also McGann and Charters (1987), 72 N.B.R. (2nd) 108 (N.B.Q.B.); R. v. Mireau, 
Sask. Q.B., N° 848-016 summarized in The Lawyers Weekly, April 28 1989, p. 18. 
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section 11(b) to ajudge-generated delay was founded solely upon an interpre-
tation of that provision. The Supreme Court thus showed its willingness to 
give full effect to guarantees whose very definition entails control of the 
judicial process. It is clear that had their Lordships relied on the exclusion of 
the courts from section 32(1) to rule out the prospect of a judicial breach of 
section 11(b), they would have very seriously impaired the effectiveness of 
this constitutional guarantee. By implicitly recognizing the autonomy of 
section 11(b), the court avoided applying one provision of the Charter 
— section 32(1) — in a way which would have gravely jeopardized the vigour 
of other Charter provisions. Hence, internal cohesion is fostered in accordance 
with the rule that the Charter ought to be approached as much as possible as a 
coherent system where "every component contributes to the meaning of the 
whole, and the whole gives meaning to its parts"44. 
Some writers have seen a contradiction between the court's interpretation 
of section 32(1) in Dolphin Delivery and the finding of a judicial infringement 
of the Charter in Rahey45. The contradiction, however, is more apparent than 
real. The fact that the Supreme Court in Rahey did not explicitly attempt to 
reconcile its decision with that in Dolphin Delivery does not render the two 
cases incompatible. As was argued above, Mr. Justice Mclntyre's judgment 
in Dolphin Delivery suggests that in cases not involving private litigation, 
judicial action may be regulated when a basis for review can be found in the 
Charter, despite the judiciary not being governmental actors. Rahey did not 
concern private litigation and their Lordships identified section 11(b) as an 
independent basis for review. 
The decision in Rahey is only one of several instances where Charter 
provisions imposing specific constitutional duties on the judiciary were found 
to have been violated without reference to any governmental action test. The 
guarantee under section 11(d) that everyone charged with an offence shall be 
tried by an "independent and impartial tribunal" can hardly be construed as 
creating no obligation for the judicial branch. In Valente v. The Queen46, the 
Supreme Court has determined that section 11 (d) embodies a requirement of 
individual judicial impartiality as well as institutional independence47. Individual 
judges have no latitude to ignore this provision which, according to the court 
44. Dubois v. /?., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350, p. 365. The Dubois case itself arguably provides an 
example of the application of section 13 to the actions of a court. The Supreme Court held 
that the admission by a criminal court of incriminatory evidence given at an earlier trial 
breached section 13, see HOGG, in BEAUDOIN, supra, note 4, p. 19. 
45. See P. HOGG, in BEAUDOIN, supra, note 4, p. 20 ; E.P. BELOBABA, supra, note 4, p. 41 ; A.J. 
PETTER and P.J. MON AH AN, supra, note 4, p. 127. 
46. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. 
47. Id., p. 685-691. 
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in Valente, pertains to "... a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of 
judicial functions..."48. 
This point is illustrated by the case of Re Jenset and the Queen49. In that 
case, a judge presiding a preliminary hearing was shown to have conducted 
the hearing in an inquisitorial fashion, forcing the accused to answer incrimi-
nating questions from the bench, and failing to allow him to make submissions 
in his defence. The reviewing court described the proceedings as a "flagrant 
example of the judge assuming the role of the prosecutor"50. In the face of 
such a mockery of justice, the court ruled that sections 11(c) and (d) had been 
violated. The committal for trial was quashed as the appropriate and just 
remedy under section 24(1). 
The vitality of all Charter rights that are textually defined as applicable 
to certain "proceedings" depends on the courts being obliged to respect them 
in their capacity as primary actors in the adjudicative process. It is submitted, 
however, that the whole group of "legal rights" contained in sections 7 to 14 
may give rise to Charter claims against judicial action, even if some of these 
provisions contain no clear textual indication to that effect. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stated that sections 8 to 14 are to be treated as specific 
manifestations of the generic guarantee laid down in section 751. The latter 
provision, in turn, clearly regulates the courts by subjecting any deprivation 
of life, liberty and security of the person to the "principles of fundamental 
justice". In Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act52, Mr. Justice 
Lamer, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court, asserted that the 
phrase "principles of fundamental justice" corresponded to the "essential 
elements of a system for the administration of justice"53. He did not doubt 
that the requirements of fundamental justice pertained primarily to the 
functioning of the courts : 
Whether any given principle may be said to be a principle of fundamental justice 
within the meaning of s. 7 will rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources, 
rationale and essential role ofthat principle within the judicial process [...] and 
in our legal system...54. 
48. Id, p. 685 and 691. 
49. (1986), 20 C.R.R. 211 (Ont. H.C.J.). 
50. Id., p. 218. 
51. See Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, p. 502; 
Oakes, supra, note 32, p. 119; Mills, supra, note 40, p. 917-918 (per Lamer J.); R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, p. 175 (per Wilson J.). 
52. Id. 
53. Id., p. 503. 
54. Id., p. 513 (emphasis added). 
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To shelter the activities of the judiciary from the full normative impact of 
a constitutional provision centred on fundamental justice would indeed have 
robbed such provision of much of its substance. Further support for the view 
that section 7 applies to courts and judges can be derived from a strong obiter 
dictum of the majority of the Supreme Court in Société des acadiens du 
Nouveau Brunswick v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education55. 
Mr. Justice Beetz observed that the right to be heard and understood by a 
court is part and parcel of the right to a fair hearing recognized by principles 
of natural justice. This right, in turn, is constitutionally protected because 
"[i]t belongs to the category of rights which in the Charter are designated as 
legal rights and indeed it is protected at least in part by provisions such as 
those of ss. 7 and 14 of the Charter56". It is partly on the basis of this 
entitlement to a fair hearing that the court decided in favour of the right for a 
party pleading before a New Brunswick court to be heard by a court "... the 
member or members of which are capable by any reasonable means of 
understanding the proceedings..."57. Although the case was not specifically 
decided on the basis of section 7, it is submitted that the Supreme Court in 
Société des acadiens accepted that this provision, subject to the restrictions 
contained therein, can be used to impose on judges the constitutional duty to 
take reasonable means to understand any language used in their courts. There 
is therefore little doubt that the Supreme Court is prepared to regard 
section 7 as a source of direct constitutional constrains on the judiciary. 
The early case of Germain v. The Queen58 provides a good illustration of 
how a judge can violate section 7 in the course of judicial proceedings. The 
case concerned an application under section 24(1) of the Charter by an 
accused person who had been placed in custody for contempt of court by the 
trial judge. It was alleged that the judge had abused the power of summary 
conviction for contempt in a way that violated the constitutional legal rights 
of the accused. Justice Macdonald agreed that the evidence showed an 
arbitrary behaviour on the part of the judge in convicting the accused. This 
conduct amounted to a breach of section 7 because : 
... the accused was deprived of his liberty by a procedure that was not in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice, which require that the 
specific nature of the complain against him be distinctly stated and that he be 
given an opportunity of answering it.59 
55. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549. 
56. Id., p. 577. See also Macdonald v. City of Montreal, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, p. 499-500. 
57. Id., p. 581. 
58. (1984), 10 C.R.R. 232 (Alta. Q.B.). 
59. Id., p. 241. 
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There are other cases where section 7 has been employed to assess the 
constitutionality of judicial action60. It is not surprising, in view of the 
substantive unity discerned by the Supreme Court between section 7 and 
sections 8 to 14, that legal rights provisions containing no textual reference to 
the judicial process have nevertheless been resorted to in order to control 
judicial misconduct. In Jenset6I the presiding judge was found to have denied 
the accused the right enshrined in section 10(b) of the Charter when he 
refused without reason to grant an adjournment to allow the accused to 
obtain counsel. A similar instance of judicial disregard for the constitutional 
rights of an accused person was revealed in R. v. M(S)6Z. A 15 year old youth 
was cited for contempt for laughing in court and, without being advised of his 
right to counsel, sentenced to 90 days in jail. The Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal held that "the trial judge was required to advise the appellant of his 
right to counsel under the Charter"63. The sentence and conviction were set 
aside in order to vindicate section 10(b) of the Charter. 
The potential sphere of judicial activity caught by the legal rights 
sections is vast. But Charter scrutiny of the third branch of the state goes 
beyond these sections. It is almost certain that courts and judges can be the 
targets of Charter claims by virtue of the equality rights provisions of 
section 15(1). It has been cogently argued that the right to equality "before the 
law" at least represents an entitlement to equality of treatment in the 
administration and enforcement of the law64. This is how equality before the 
law in the Canadian Bill of Rights65 was interpreted66, and the Supreme 
Court in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia67 impliedly gave a 
similar content to the corresponding words of section 15 of the Charter. 
Mr. Justice Mclntyre, expressing the views of the court on the matter, stated 
that in guaranteeing three basic equality rights in addition to equality before 
the law, the Charter was intended to provide a broader protection than the 
Canadian Bill of Rights. He noted : 
60. See for example R. v. Baumet (1987), 50 Sask. R. 210 (Sask. CA.). 
61. Supra, note 49. 
62. (1988), 40 C.C.C. (3d) 242. 
63. Id., p. 244. 
64. See J.W.S. TARNOPOLSKY and W.F. PENTNEY, Discrimination and the Law, De Boo, 1985, 
p. 16-10 and 16-11 ; A.F. BAYEFSKY, "Defining Equality Rights", in A.F. BAYEFSKY and 
EBERTS M. (eds.), Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
Carswell, 1985, l ,p. 4-12; A.F. BAYEFSKY, "Defining Equality Rights Under the Charter", 
in K.E. MAHONEY and S.L. MARTIN (eds.), Equality and Judicial Neutrality, Carswell, 
1987, 106, p. 107-108. 
65. R.S.C. 1970, App. Ill, 1(b). 
66. See Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349. 
67. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
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Section 15 spells out four basic rights : (1) the right to equality before the law ; 
(2) the right to equality under the law ; (3) the right to equal protection of the 
law ; and (4) the right to equal benefit of the law. The inclusion of these last three 
additional rights in s. 15 of the Charter was an attempt to remedy some of the 
shortcomings of the right to equality in the Canadian Bill of Rights.6S 
According to Tarnopolsky, when the right to equality before the law is 
combined with the other equality clauses provided for in section 15(1), "it 
does appear that it was intended that section 15 should govern every application 
and implementation of the law"69. The judicial process of enforcement and 
implementation of the law should therefore be easily caught by section 15. 
The foregoing reasoning, on the other hand, cannot be extended to the 
judicial enforcement of the private common law until the Supreme Court 
reverses its refusal to apply the Charter directly to such law. 
Unequal enforcement of the law could also be impugned through 
section 7 when a court order occasions a deprivation of life, liberty and 
security of the person. It is submitted that such judicial conduct would offend 
the principles of fundamental justice. The various provisions of the Charter 
do not operate as watertight compartments and the basic ideal of equality 
before the law cannot be neatly disentangled from the values of justice 
enshrined in section 770. The Supreme Court has declined in R. v. Cornell101 
to rest the constitutional safeguard of the principle of equality before the law 
on section 7 with respect to a cause of action arising prior to the coming into 
force of section 15. It would have been contrary to the intent of the framers, in 
the court's view, to resolve a Charter case on the basis of equality principles 
while the central equality provision was not yet effective70-2. Mr. Justice Le 
Dain, however, explicitly refrained from holding that section 15 dealt exhaus-
tively with the issue of equality70-3. 
In the light of this overview of judicial decisions and Charter provisions, 
it is easy to concur with Professor Hogg when he writes that "some provisions 
of the Charter can work only on the basis that the courts are bound by the 
68. Id., p. 14 of his reasons for judgment. 
69. Id., p. 16-11. 
70. For a judicial pronouncement on the interdependence of various Charter provisions, see R. 
v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, p. 326 {per La Forest J.). 
70.1 [1988] I S.C.R. 461. 
70.2 Id., p. 478. 
70.3 Id. His Lordship emphasized that he reached his conclusion in view of "the clear intention 
of the framers of the Charter as to when the constitutional protection of the right to 
equality before the law was to take effect, not on the basis of the maxim expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius..." He added that "... there may be some overlap between section 7 and 
other provisions of the Charter." 
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Charter71". The author also maintains that, in spite of Dolphin Delivery, 
these provisions require that the meaning of "government" in section 32(1) be 
extended to the courts72. He seems to assume that following Dolphin 
Delivery section 32(1) is necessarily conclusive on the question of Charter 
review of judicial conduct. This assumption seems incorrect since, as was 
shown above, there is another way of harmonizing decisions like Rahey and 
Dolphin Delivery. 
There is nonetheless an imperative need for the Supreme Court to 
coordinate its various rulings and clarify its position with respect to the 
impact of the Charter on the judiciary. The court's failure in Rahey even to 
allude to Dolphin Delivery suggests a regrettable tendency to substitute ad 
hoc reasoning for a clear and coherent exposition of Charter jurisprudence. 
The same can be said of the failure to explain in B. C. G.E. U. why section 32(1) 
and its governmental action test were not required for the resolution of the 
case. Improvisation thwarts the sound development of constitutional doctrine. 
For instance, a combination of the approaches in Dolphin Delivery and 
Rahey could have afforded the court in B.C.G.E.U. a double-barrelled 
justification for assessing the consistency of the injunction with sections 7 and 
11 of the Charter. First, the case involved public law, and secondly, the 
judicial process is regulated by sections 7 and 11 by virtue of the very 
definition of the guarantees enshrined therein. The problem of the application 
of the Charter to the judiciary highlights the necessity for Canada's highest 
court to return to the commendable commitment to systematic analysis it 
evinced in the early days of the Charter. 
2. The Problem of Redress for Judicial Breaches of the Charter 
Once a judicial breach of the Charter has been declared, the reviewing 
court is faced with the responsibility, pursuant to section 24(1), of ensuring 
that the wrong shall not remain unremedied. The courts have so far properly 
discharged this mission in the context of criminal proceedings by granting a 
range of remedies of a criminal nature. The effective enforcement of the 
Charter may, however, prove more problematical when a monetary claim is 
brought in a civil court against a judge in connection with a Charter violation. 
This section examines the specific difficulties arising when a monetary suit is 
instituted on the basis of section 24(1) of the Charter. 
71. Supra, note 4, (1987) Sask. L. Rev. 273, p. 275. See also BAUDOIN, supra, note 4, p. 29; 
TASSÉ, supra, note 4, p. 62. 
72. Id. 
690 Les Cahiers de Droit (1989) 30 C. de D. 673 
2.1. Section 24(1) and Non-Constitutional Principles of Immunity 
It is now widely accepted that monetary redress is part of the panoply of 
remedies obtainable under section 24(1)73. The first problem to be resolved in 
ascertaining the position of members of the judiciary with respect to constitu-
tional pecuniary suits pertains to whether restrictions of liability that may 
exist at common law or under statute are directly applicable to such suits. 
Section 24(1) confers on a court of competent jurisdiction the broad constitu-
tional authority to determine the proper remedial response to a breach of 
constitutional rights. As one author put it, "the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms entrenches both the right to apply to a court for a remedy and 
the courts' discretion to fashion the appropriate remedy"74. The constitutional 
supremacy of section 24(1) should accordingly secure the full operation of 
judicial remedial discretion without constraint from legislation, the Civil 
Code or the common law as to what is appropriate and just in a given case. 
The entrenched remedial authority generated by section 24(1) means that the 
decision as to who should be liable, and on what basis, lies solely in the hands 
of the judiciary. 
Since the raison d'être of section 24(1) is the vindication of the constitution 
of which it is an integral part75, the remedial power it recognizes must be 
exercised only in accordance with the constitution as the sole binding law on 
the question of liability. It follows that section 24(1) should be interpreted as 
representing a distinct source of liability and embodying a novel remedy76. 
The constitutional cause of action has a life of its own within the structure of 
the Charter, being informed by its own textual and contextual environment, 
and fulfilling a unique function of constitutional implementation. The issue 
73. The main studies on monetary redress under the Charter are : M.L. PILKINGTON, "Damages 
as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", (1984) 62 
Can. Bar. Rev. 517 ; M.L. PILKINGTON, "Monetary Redress for Charter Infringement" in 
R.J. SHARPE (ed.), Charter Litigation, Toronto, Butterworths, 1987, 307; K. COOPER-
STEPHENSON, "Tort Theory for the Charter Damages Remedy", (1988) 52 Sask. L. Rev. 1. 
74. See PILKINGTON, id., p. 531. 
75. In Mills, supra, note 40, Mr. Justice Lamer stated p. 881 that the purpose of section 24(1) is 
to ensure "that the Charier will be a vibrant and vigourous instrument for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of Canadians [...] Section 24( 1 ) establishes the right to a remedy as 
the foundation stone for the effective enforcement of Charter rights". See also B. C. G.E. U., 
supra, note 25, p. 229. 
76. This seems to be the way the courts have generally treated the cause of action under 
section 24(1), see Collin v. Lussier (1983), 6 C.R.R. 89 (F.C.T.D.) reversed on other 
grounds (1986), 20 C.R.R. 29 (F.C.A.); Bertram S. Miller Ltd. v. The Queen (1985), 15 
C.R.R. 298 (F.C.T.D.) reversed on other grounds (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 210 (F.C.A.); 
Lordv. Allison(1986), 3 B.C.L.R. (2d)300(B.C.S.C.) ; R. v. B.B. (1986), 69 A.R. 203(Alta. 
Prov. C) . 
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of judicial liability or immunity under the Charter is consequently not 
governed by the common law, the Civil Code or statute law. It is strictly a 
matter of constitutional law, although the courts might want, when appropriate 
and just, to draw useful analogies with traditional non-constitutional 
principles. 
There is a line of cases, however, which hold that non-constitutional 
rules may be determinative of judicial liability for breach of the Charter if 
they impose a reasonable limit, within the meaning of section 1, on the court's 
power under section 24(1) to determine the avenue of redress it considers 
appropriate and just. The validity of this position obviously depends on 
whether the limitation clause of the Charter extends to section 24(1). The 
courts have assumed wrongly, it is submitted, that the ambit of section 1 is 
not confined to the substantive provisions of the Charter. Thus, in Charters v. 
Harper77, monetary redress was sought under section 24(1) from a Provincial 
Court judge for the infringement of the plaintiff's right under 11(b) to be tried 
within a reasonable time. The defendant contented that he was immune from 
the suit by virtue of the Protection of Persons Acting Statute Act1%. He 
claimed, in other words, that the statute could be applied to restrict the power 
of the court to decide whether the plaintiff's pecuniary claim against him 
personally was appropriate and just in the circumstances. The plaintiff, on the 
other hand, maintained that an ordinary statute could not affect his constitu-
tional position under section 24(1). The court ruled in favour of the defendant 
on this particular issue. The judge said : 
The plaintiff submits that the provincial statute is superseded by the provisions 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but for my purposes, I do not 
accept that submission as s. 1 of the Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms 
therein set forth "subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". It would be my opinion 
that the necessity for a protective statute such as c. P-20 could easily be justified 
to protect honest bona fide acting persons from harassing actions. Courts or 
judges must not be subject to litigation for acts performed conscientiously in the 
course of their duties, even if in error79. 
The court therefore found it possible to invoke section 1 to justify a 
statutory limitation imposed upon the victim's constitutional right to seek, 
and the constitutional power of the court to grant, monetary redress. It is 
unfortunate that the judge did not even query whether judicial liability would 
have been appropriate and just under section 24(1) in the first place. The 
77. (1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 469 (N.B.Q.B.). 
78. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-20, ss 1, 2, 3. 
79. Supra, note 77, p. 470. 
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decision in Charters was followed in Somerville v. Lynch80. This was another 
case from New Brunswick where a Provincial Court judge was sued personally 
under section 24(1) for the alleged infringement of various Charter rights. 
The court quoted the above passage from the previous judgment and found 
that the statute prevailed accordingly81. The court went further, however, in 
ruling that the judicial immunity recognized by the common law also 
prevailed82. Similarly, Mr. Justice Rothman said in an obiter dictum in 
Royer n that even if the Charter were applicable to judicial acts, the common 
law rule of immunity "would be justified as a reasonable limit on the rights of 
action of citizens in a free and democratic society and, as such, it could come 
within the saving provision of s. 1 of the Charter"84. 
It is submitted that, on the contrary, the limitation clause only applies to 
substantive rights and freedoms. This view is supported by both the text and 
context of sections 1 and 24(1). The first textual point is that the qualified 
guarantee stated in section 1 refers only to "rights and freedoms" and not to 
"remedies", so that Madame Justice Wilson accurately observed in Rahey%s 
that "... it is rights that are guaranteed under the Charter not remedies"86. 
This view of the scope of section 1 appears reinforced by the wording of 
section 24(1). The phrase "as guaranteed by this Charter" used in that 
provision refers clearly to the guarantee stipulated in section 1. It is equally 
clear that the balancing process of section 1 is treated in section 24(1) as 
something external to the remedial stage since the phrase quoted above 
qualifies the terms "rights or freedoms" as opposed to the other portions of 
section 24(1) that give access to a court of competent jurisdiction and entrust 
such court with the authority to fashion an appropriate and just remedy. It is 
therefore reasonable to infer from the way section 24(1) has been framed that 
the limited guarantee proclaimed by section 1 applies to the provisions where 
the rights and freedoms are actually set forth. 
It is important to note that the limitation clause and the remedial 
provision play different roles within the scheme of the Charter. Section 1 
states and limits the guarantee of constitutional rights and freedoms whereas 
section 24(1) affords a means of giving practical effect to these rights and 
freedoms when they are breached. This delimitation of the respective sphere 
80. (1987), 74 N.B.R. (2d) 438 (N.B.Q.B.) 
81 Id, p. 443. 
82 Id., p. 447. 
83 Supra, note 13. 
84 Id., p. 17. 
85 Supra, note 42. 
86 Id., p. 621. 
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of rights and remedies is at least implicit in the following description, 
proposed by the Supreme Court, of the structure of the Charter : 
Earlier sections of the Charter assure, in clear and specific terms, certain 
fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, and 
equality rights of utmost importance to each and every Canadian. And what 
happens if those rights and freedoms are infringed or denied? Section 24(1) 
provides the answer — anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in 
the circumstances. The rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Charter and 
the courts are directed to provide a remedy in the event of infringement.87 
Beyond a textual and structural analysis of the Charter, the central 
importance of the vindication of rights through an effective remedial provision 
militates strongly in favour of section 24( 1 ) being immune from a "reasonable 
limit" on its application. The Canadian courts have traditionally been hostile 
to measures whereby government seeks to insulate itself from its constitutional 
duties through the enactment or imposition of limitations on the availability 
of remedial measures with regard to breaches of the constitution. Attempts to 
introduce the equivalent of constitutional privative clauses designed to 
prevent judicial review of the constitutionality of laws have been consistently 
rejected by the courts88. Similarly, the courts have dismissed claims of 
statutory or common law immunity from monetary suits in relation to taxes 
levied unconstitutionally89. 
In Mills90 a majority of the Supreme Court have expressed opinions 
which suggest that legislative interference with the judicial power under 
section 24(1) cannot be contemplated. Mr. Justice Lamer referred to the 
"unique character of a constitutional remedy"91 to support his position that 
"a constitutional remedy and its accessibility should not in principle be open 
to statutory limitation"92. Mr. Justice La Forest agreed on this point with the 
three justices for whom Mr. Justice Lamer was speaking93. Hostility to any 
attempt to tamper with the courts' remedial mission pursuant to section 24(1) 
can also be detected in the following observations made by Canada's Chief 
Justice in B. C. G.E. U. : 
87. See B.C.G.E.V., supra, note 25, p. 229. 
88. See Air Canada v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 539, p. 543; 
Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, p. 151. 
89. See Amax Potash Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576 ; Air Canada, 
id. 
90. Supra, note 40. 
91. Id., p. 893. 
92. Id. 
93. Id., p. 971-972. 
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... it would be inconceivable that Parliament and the provinces should describe 
in such detail the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and should not 
first protect that which alones makes it in fact possible to benefit from such 
guarantees, that is, access to a court [...] Of what value are the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter if a person is denied or delayed access to a 
court of competent jurisdiction in order to vindicate them ? How can the courts 
independently maintain the rule of law and effectively discharge the duties 
imposed by the Charter if court access is hindered, impeded or denied? The 
Charter protections would become merely illusory, the entire Charter 
undermined94. 
It is true that the extension of the reasonable limit test to section 24(1) 
would probably not completely deprive a victim of the right to seek some 
remedy. A law purporting to effect a total denial of redress would likely not be 
found reasonable under section 1. But the traditional sensitivity of Canadian 
constitutional doctrine for the effective enforcement of the supreme law at 
least suggests that any ambiguity as to the scope of section 1 should be 
resolved in a way that ensures the unrestricted operation of section 24(1). It 
must be remembered that "any doubt about the effect of a provision of the 
Constitution must be resolved in favor of the citizen"95. To allow the 
justification of limitations on the remedial authority of the courts could 
further restrict an already qualified protection of rights and freedoms. 
It is accordingly submitted that no effect can be given to any statute or 
rule of common law purporting to determine what remedy is or is not 
appropriate and just under section 24( 1 ). Any such rule of law is precluded by 
section 52(l)ofthe Constitution Act, 1982 from governing the constitutional 
law of monetary redress. 
2.2. Judicial Immunity from Personal Liability : 
A Constitutional Imperative 
When faced with a Charter violation of a judicial nature, a court should 
first enquire whether monetary redress is required either to compensate the 
victim for actual injury, or to deter future egregious disregard for constitutional 
rights96. If the answer is affirmative, the court's duty to vindicate the victim's 
paramount constitutional position should take precedence over governmental 
94. Supra, note 25, p. 229. 
95. Alliance des professeurs de Montréal v. Attorney General for Quebec (1986), 21 D.L.R. 
(4th) 354, p. 374 (Que. CA.). 
96. Deterrence constitutes one of the means of vindicating Charter rights, see Collin, supra, 
note 76; Lord, supra, note 76 and Crossman v. The Queen (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 547 
(F.C.T.D.). 
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interests, unless immunity can be said to be prescribed as a countervailing 
constitutional imperative. 
If the function of section 24(1) is to uphold constitutional values, it 
should follow that the remedial role of the courts ought not to be performed 
in a manner which undermines constitutionally enshrined principles. Their 
power should, to the greatest possible extent, be integrated harmoniously 
into the overall structure of the constitution. The need for cohesion within the 
constitution has been emphasized by the Supreme Court in its interpretation 
of the Charter. In Dubois v. R.97, for example, Mr. Justice Lamer stated that 
no provision of the Charter should be construed in a way that implies the 
breach of another provision98. Mr. Justice La Forest also said in Lyons v. 
The Queen " that "the Charter is a complex of interacting values, each more 
or less fundamental to the free and democratic society that is Canada" 10°. 
An illustration of the use of the internal cohesion analysis may be found 
in R. v. Morgentaler m where in her concurring opinion Madame Justice 
Wilson wrote that section 251 of the Criminal Code not only deprived a 
pregnant woman of her liberty and security of the person, but also offended 
the freedom of conscience guaranteed in section 2(a) of the Charter. Madame 
Justice Wilson used this link between Charter rights and freedoms to 
conclude that a "... deprivation of the section 7 right which has the effect of 
infringing a right guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter cannot be in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice"102. 
Another ruling by the Supreme Court shows how even other parts of the 
constitution can influence the scope of the provisions of the Charter. In 
Reference re An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ontario)103, certain rights 
and privileges had been accorded specifically to Roman Catholic denominational 
schools by the Ontario Legislature in conformity with section 93(3) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The court was asked to decide whether the Ontario 
legislation infringed religious freedom (s. 2(a) ) and the equality rights (15(1) ) 
enshrined in the Charter. It was found that no Charter constraint could affect 
the operation of section 93(3). Madame Justice Wilson thought that "[i]t was 
97. Supra, note 44. 
98. Id., p. 366. 
99. Supra, note 70. 
100. Id., p. 326. 
101. Supra, note 51. 
102. Id., p. 175. She recently applied the same approach to section 8 in R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 495, p. 545 ; R. v. Jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548, p. 561-563 ; R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 980, p. 1012. 
103. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1149. 
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never intended [...] that the Charter could be used to invalidate other 
provisions of the Constitution..."104. As for Mr. Justice Estey he stated : 
Although the Charter is intended to constrain the exercise of legislative power 
conferred under the Constitution Act, 1867 where the delineated rights of 
individual members of the community are adversely affected, it cannot be 
interpreted as rendering unconstitutional distinctions that are expressly permitted 
by the Constitution Act, 1867.105 
In designing constitutional remedies, the courts should therefore be 
responsive to the interaction and tension between constitutional principles 
and provisions. This point is illustrated dramatically by the case of Reference 
re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act, 1870106 where the supremacy of 
the constitution decreed by section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
collided with the doctrine of the rule of law. The Supreme Court ruled that, 
despite a persistent violation by Manitoba of section 23 the Manitoba Act, 
1870, an unqualified declaration of invalidity of all offending laws would 
have thrown the province into a legal void, thereby causing a transgression of 
the rule of law 107. Since "the constitutional status of the rule of law is beyond 
question"108, an adequate remedial response, in the opinion of the court, 
could not exclusively vindicate the linguistic rights of French-speaking 
Manitobans. The court felt its remedial responsibility was to accommodate 
both the constitutional imperative of enforcing these rights and the competing 
constitutional necessity of maintaining the rule of law in Manitoba109. Hence 
the order of temporary application of the laws declared unconstitutional. 
There is little doubt that the courts' duty to preserve the integrity of the 
constitution can impose limitations on judicial discretion under section 24(1) 
of the Charter. It is in this context that the issue of judicial immunity from 
monetary liability should be addressed. An exemption from the full impact of 
section 24(1) in favour of the judiciary should certainly not be easily conceded. 
As guardians of the constitution ' l0, judges should be the first to obey its 
104. Id., p. 1197. 
105. Id., p. 1207. 
106. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721. 
107. Id., p. 747-748. 
108. Id, p. 750. 
109. Id., p. 753 where the Chief Justice states that "[t]he task the court faces is to recognize the 
unconstitutionality of Manitoba's unilingual laws and the Legislature's duty to comply 
with the 'supreme law' of this country, while avoiding a legal vacuum in Manitoba and 
ensuring the continuity of the rule of law". 
110. In Hunter v.Southam Inc., [1984]2S. CR. 145, Dickson J. said at p. 169 that the courts are 
"the guardians of the Constitution". Similarly in The Queen v. Beauregard, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
56, he described p. 70 the judicial branch as the "protector of the constitution and the 
fundamental values embodied in it...". 
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dictates. But judicial liability has been restricted or denied at common law 
and under statute in order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary1U. 
One commentator even said that "at the core of the principle of judicial 
independence lies the immunity of judges from civil actions" '12. The significance 
of this rationale in the context of the Charter will depend first on whether or 
not judicial independence represents a constitutionally enshrined doctrine, 
and secondly, on whether personal liability does in fact conflict with judicial 
independence as it is defined for constitutional purposes. 
The Supreme Court examined the foundations of judicial independence 
in Canada in The Queen v. Beauregard ' l3. Their Lordships made it clear that 
judicial independence is entrenched in the Canadian constitution. The court 
had to rule on the constitutionality of a federal statute affecting the financial 
status of some federally appointed judges. The validity of the statute was 
impugned on the ground that it interferred, or could be perceived as interferring, 
with the independence of certain judges. Speaking for the court on this point, 
Chief Justice Dickson characterized judicial independence as "the lifeblood 
of constitutionalism in democratic societies" "4. 
The Chief Justice found in Canada's written constitution three distinct 
sources of the principle of judicial independence. First, the distribution of 
power between federal and provincial governments provided for in the 
Constitution Act, 1867 requires an impartial judicial umpire to resolve 
disputes between governments and individuals who rely on the federal 
distribution of power. Secondly, the advent of the Charter also renders 
judicial independence essential for the effective defence of human rights 
against state intrusions. Thirdly, the Chief Justice discerned a direct textual 
recognition of the need for an independent judiciary in the preamble of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, which states that Canada is to have a constitution 
similar "in principle to that of the United Kingdom". He also referred to the 
provisions of the same Act dealing with the judiciary "5 . It should be added 
that judicial independence is explicitly required in proceedings regulated by 
section 11(d) of the Charter. In addition, it can no doubt be counted among 
the principles of fundamental justice that must be observed according to 
111. See Morier and Boily v. Rivard, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 716, p. 737-745, R.J. SADLER, "Judicial 
and Quasi-Judicial Immunities : A Remedy Denied", (1981-82) 13 M. U.L.R. 508, p. 524-52 ; 
H.P. GLENN, "La responsabilité des juges", (1982-83) 28 McGillL.J. 228, p. 261 ; G. PÉPIN, 
"L'immunité absolue des juges des cours supérieures et des commissaires-enquêteurs, en 
matière de responsabilité civile", (1986) 46 R. du B. 149, p. 151. 
112. M. BRAZIER, "Judicial Immunity and the Independence of the Judiciary", [1976] P.L. 397. 
113. Supra, note 110. 
114. Id., p. 70. 
115. Id., p. 70-73. 
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section 7 when there is a deprivation of life, liberty and security of the 
person116. 
Even if the constitutional stature of judicial independence is beyond 
doubt, the content of the principle must be circumscribed in order to ascertain 
whether it requires insulating judges from monetary liability under the 
Charter. Chief Justice Dickson wrote in Beauregard: 
Historically, the generally accepted core of the principle of judicial independence 
has been the complete liberty of individual judges to hear and decide the cases 
that come before them: no outsider — be it government, pressure group, 
individual or even another judge, should interfere in fact, or attempt to 
interfere, with the way in which a judge conducts his or her case and makes his or 
her decision. " 7 
Judicial independence is also a matter of perception. The Supreme Court 
in Valente stated that the judiciary must be perceived to be free from any 
outside interference118. The appearance of independence has proved a key 
factor in the recognition of judicial immunity at common law. In Nakhla v. 
McCarthy "9, Mr. Justice Woodhouse of the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
justified the common law rule by pointing out that "[i]t lies in the right of men 
and women to/ee/that when discharging his judicial responsibilities a judge 
will have no more reason to be affected by fear than he will allow himself to be 
subjected to influences of favour..."120. 
It seems fair to suggest that the possibility of a judge being made 
personally answerable in civil proceedings, instigated by any of the parties 
appearing before him or her, would create a reasonable perception that he or 
she is not totally free from outside individual interference in relation to the 
discharge of his or her judicial function. Moreover, as was emphasized by 
Chief Justice Dickson, judicial independence demands that judges be secure 
not only from actual interference but also from any attempt to interfere. It is 
116. See for example, Re Sethi and Minister of Employment and Immigration et al. (1988), 50 
D.L.R. (4th) 669 (F.C.T.D.) where Reed J. ruled that the basic principles of natural justice 
and fundamental justice prescribed by s. 7 of the Charter require that a person's rights be 
adjudicated upon by an independent decision-maker. The Appeal Division reversed 
Reed J.'s decision on the question whether there was indeed a risk of impartiality in the 
case. But the requirement of impartiality on the basis of section 7 was not questioned. See 
F.C. A.-493-88 (20-6-88). On the constitutional foundations of judicial independence in 
Canada see generally, K. BENYEKHLEF, Les garanties constitutionnelles relatives à l'indé-
pendance du pouvoir judiciaire au Canada, Cowansville, Y. Biais, 1988. 
117. Supra, note 110, p. 69. 
118. Supra, note 46, p. 689. 
119. [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 291 (CA.). 
120. Id., p. 294, emphasis added. 
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therefore submitted that shielding judges from personal constitutional liability 
would represent an appropriate and just way of upholding this high degree of 
independence. It must be borne in mind that such a denial of a cause of action 
against a judge personally is not simply designed to advance the utilitarian 
values of governmental thrift and efficiency. It is aimed at ensuring the 
integrity of the constitution itself. Exempting judges from personal suits does 
not contravene the rule of law. In fact, the rules protecting the independence 
of the judiciary are intended : 
... to guarantee that they will be free from extraneous pressures and independent 
of all authority save that of the law. They are, therefore, essential for the 
preservation of the rule of law. m 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that judges are immune 
from suit in relation to constitutional wrongdoing122. But the idea of protecting 
judges completely from personal liability has by no means earned the support 
of all commentators in Canada. Some, like Professor Pilkington, maintain 
that the personal accountability of judges to the victim of a constitutional 
breach is desirable in order to check wrongdoing by members of the judiciary123. 
This view, however, is too insensitive to the constitutional imperative of 
bolstering judicial independence as it was defined in Beauregard. Perhaps the 
most common and effective criticism of absolute immunity is that it denies 
redress to the victim124. In Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and 
Tobago (N° 2)125, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council applied a 
solution which simultaneously provides the constitutionally required protection 
of judges from personal suits and avoids the injustice of leaving the wrong 
unredressed. In that case, a lawyer was remanded in custody for contempt of 
court and it was found that his rights under the constitution of Trinidad and 
Tobago had been violated 126. A subsequent monetary claim against the judge 
based on the general remedial provision contained in the constitution reached 
the Privy Council. The judgment of the majority was written by Lord Diplock 
who held the state of Trinidad and Tobago directly liable under the constitution 
for a breach of constitutional rights in the performance "of the judicial power 
of the state"127. Their Lordships did not impose any primary liability on the 
judge personally. 
121. J. RAZ, "The Rule of Law and its Virtue", (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 195, p. 201. 
122. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), p. 554-555. 
123. Supra, note 73, p. 560-561. 
124. SADLER, supra, note 111, p. 530; BRAZIER, supra, note 112, p. 400; PILKINGTON, supra, 
note 73, p. 560. 
125. [1978] 2 All E.R. 670. 
126. [1975] I All E.R. 411 (P.C.). 
127. Supra, note 125, p. 679. 
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A number of pronouncements by Canadian courts indicate that this 
approach may well be imported into Charter jurisprudence.I28 It is submitted 
that this would be the correct way of dealing with the question of constitutional 
liability with regard to violations of judicial origin. Exclusive direct institutional 
liability reconciles the objective of vindicating the guarantees contained in the 
Charter with the goal of preserving a countervailing principle that is entrenched 
in the supreme law of Canada. State liability may also allow some indirect 
judicial accountability. The public airing in open court of judicial wrongdoing, 
and the imposition of monetary liability on the state in connection with 
proven judicial abuse of power, might remind judges that as the custodians of 
the constitution they ought not to behave as if they stand above it. 
Conclusion 
The judiciary could without great difficulty have been considered as part 
of "government" within the terms of section 32(1). The Supreme Court's 
failure to do so has understandably caused confusion if not bewilderment 
among observers. One writer even raised the prospect of a constitutional 
amendment as a means of defeating a possible exemption of the courts from 
Charter control129. Such a development will not prove necessary as the 
Supreme Court is now gradually making clear that the governmental action 
test does not afford an exhaustive answer to the question of Charter application 
to the judicial branch. Canada's highest jurisdiction has not hesitated, even 
after its ruling in Dolphin Delivery, to find judicial breaches of constitutional 
rights. Such breaches have been found when there was no risk of extending 
the Charter to purely private conduct and when a basis for constraining the 
judiciary could be detected somewhere in the Charter. 
Only a clear acknowledgment that the courts are among the actors 
falling within the purview of section 32(1) would be totally satisfactory. But 
the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to minimize judicial immunity 
from Charter review is welcome. This trend might eventually culminate in a 
reinterpretation of section 32(1). 
Just as the constitution requires compliance by the courts with constitu-
tional rights, it demands a cautious handling of judicial infringements at the 
remedial stage. Judicial independence, as a constitutionally protected principle, 
should be reconciled as much as possible with the imperative of giving 
practical effect to constitutional guarantees. Remedial duties related to 
128. See Germain, supra, note 58, p. 244 and Royer, supra, note 13, p. 16. 
129. See GIBSON, supra, note 4, p. 83. 
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Charter violations of judicial origin should therefore be directed at the state 
and not at judges qua individuals. This remedial approach is not only 
consonant with the need to encourage a judicial attitude of impartiality, it 
also adequately reflects the state's being the primary target of Charter 
dictates. 
